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Public participation has become an important part of how US government agencies make decisions
about their regulations. In new research, Neal D. Woods assesses the effects of increasing public
access to decision makers in environmental agencies on environmental compliance costs. He also
examines how public access to elected political officials who review environmental regulations affect
these costs. He finds that when agency rule-makers are more open to public participation, then their
environmental regulation is much less stringent. Access to reviewing political officials, on the other
hand, leads to higher regulatory compliance costs when states have a stronger organized
environmental movement, and lower costs when organized manufacturing groups are stronger.
Government regulation is a central feature of the modern industrial state.  Regulations governing the workplace, the
environment, the economy, and virtually every other aspect of life are put forward by administrative agencies.  This
extensive level of policymaking by unelected bureaucrats inevitably raises questions about the democratic
accountability of agency decisionmaking. Many observers advocate public involvement in the process of formulating
rules and regulations as a solution to these accountability issues.
Although procedural requirements designed to foster public participation are usually discussed in terms of fair
process, they may also have a substantial effect on public policy outcomes.  This effect, however, is not well
understood.  In fact, depending on the literature one consults, one could conclude that these procedures (1)
enhance regulatory stringency by fostering access by previously underrepresented groups , (2) reduce regulatory
stringency by institutionalizing access by regulated industries, (3) could either increase or decrease stringency
depending on the relative strength of organized interests in the agency’s external environment, or (4) have no effect.
My recent research assesses the policy consequences of a variety of procedural mechanisms designed to promote
“regulatory democracy” by broadening public participation in administrative rulemaking in the American states.
  While there is little variation in the public participation mechanisms available at the US national level, we can see a
great deal of diversity across the states.  Important differences include whether citizens have the right to present oral
and written comments during the rulemaking process, the amount and type of public notification required, and
whether citizens may petition for amendment or repeal of an administrative rule after it has been promulgated.  Such
procedures may impact the amount and type of participation in regulatory decision-making.
To illustrate these differences, Figure 1 shows the number of American states that employ certain public access
requirements. The blue bars indicate the number of state environmental agencies that are required to provide
citizens with these access opportunities.  Additionally, in many states political officials such as the governor, attorney
general, or legislature have formal processes that allow them to review agency regulations and modify or veto them
before they go into effect.  The red bars indicate the number of states that require the relevant form of public access
to these reviewing entities.
Figure 1- Number of American states employing various public access procedures  
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My analyses assess the effects of public access requirements such as these on the private costs of environmental
compliance, which represents the economic burden imposed by environmental regulation on industry. The results
suggest that openness requirements that provide private parties with direct access to agency rulemaking
systematically serve to decrease these environmental compliance costs.  This effect is evident for public access
both to the agencies promulgating environmental regulations and to external entities reviewing these regulations.
Thus, in the environmental arena increased openness to public participation appears to result in significantly less
stringent regulation.
These findings argue against the view that environmental administrators are effectively buffered from outside
influence by their technical expertise and administrative professionalism, suggesting that they, like elected political
officials, are responsive to participation by affected interests. Although this finding may come as a surprise to some
readers, it is consistent with recent research on the rulemaking process.  Observers have noted that regulated
interests often dominate comment submissions during rulemaking proceedings. Moreover, recent research suggests
that changes in agency rules are made more often and have greater impact when made in response to comments
from business interests than from other external participants in the rulemaking process.  My findings buttress these
previous studies, indicating that increasing the openness of the rulemaking process may lead to significantly weaker
overall levels of regulation.
Although increased public access to both agency decision-makers and reviewing political officials leads to
decreased environmental compliance costs, the two are not alike in every respect.  For environmental agencies
public participation requirements are associated with reduced regulatory stringency regardless of the strength of
environmental or industry groups, a result that is consistent with the view that regulatory agencies may tend to get
“captured” by regulated interests.
For political officials, however, the effect of regulatory openness follows a somewhat different pattern.  Greater
public access to rule review proceedings is associated with increased regulatory compliance costs in states
characterized by a stronger organized environmental movement, and is associated with decreased costs in states
with stronger organized manufacturing groups (as measured by the number of each of these groups registered to
lobby in the state).  Figure 2 illustrates these effects.
Figure 2 – Marginal effect of rule review access on environmental compliance costs, by interest group
strength
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The upward sloping line in the upper panel indicates that rule review access procedures are associated with higher
regulatory compliance costs as environmental interest group strength increases.  In the lower panel we see the
opposite pattern, with rule review access having an increasingly negative effect as levels of manufacturing group
strength increase. These findings suggest that, in contrast to the agencies themselves, political officials respond to
the relative strength of both environmental and industry interest groups when reviewing agency regulations.  On
average, however, industry tends to have stronger organized representation than the environmental movement, thus
generally leading to weaker regulation.
Although different in this respect, the end result of increased access to both regulators and political officials is
weaker regulation.  If future research finds similar results to hold in other political contexts, the implication is that the
general trend towards increased openness in rulemaking proceedings that has been evident in federal, state, and
local governments over the past four decades may have served to decrease the stringency of regulation by further
empowering industry interests.  This is almost certainly not the result that most proponents of “regulatory
democracy” are looking for.
These results highlight how seemingly neutral administrative procedures can affect policy outcomes.  Numerous
other procedural requirements, from consultation requirements to policy analysis procedures, have been imposed
on agencies in an effort to make them more responsive, efficient, or equitable. My results suggest that these
requirements may have significant —and perhaps unanticipated— policy consequences as well. 
This article was based on “Regulatory Democracy Reconsidered: The Policy Impact of Public Participation
Requirements” which appeared in the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory.
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